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Abstract 
 
Macondo blowout also known as the Deep Water Horizon incident has been one of the 
biggest oil field disaster in history. It has also become an effective case study for the Health 
Safety and Environmental aspects of the Petroleum Industry.  
 
This thesis deals by exhaustively comparing the GAP between the Macondo blowout 
with the regulations, recommended practices, guidelines, Industry standards and codes that 
existed prior to the blowout (Pre-Macondo) and what was actually implemented in case of 
deep water horizon as well as analyzing it with the current Norwegian / International 
Standards and codes (Post-Macondo). 
 
To understand the GAP analysis, it is necessary to understand the background of the 
Macondo incident so that the reader could understand the discrepancies between Pre-
Macondo and Post-Macondo more fully, therefore this thesis starts by exhaustively 
performing a review of literature on the series of events that led to the Macondo blowout, 
safety systems that were employed at Deepwater Horizon followed by the GAP analysis which 
forms the basis for the discussion and conclusion at the end. 
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I. Introduction 
In 2010, a major well blow out incident occurred on the Deepwater Horizon Drilling rig. 
The incident happened on Macondo well located in Canyon Block 252, Mississippi offshore. 
This thesis investigated and analyzed the GAPs between the BP design and well established 
regulations/standards and codes. 
 
I.1 Scope and limitations 
The Macondo blowout incident happened following a series of events which led to 
formation fluids entering the wellbore undetected and on April 20th the blowout occurred. 
The blow out was followed by the Deepwater horizon (the rig) sinking to the sea floor and 
hydrocarbon started flowing directly in to the sea to cause the biggest environmental disaster. 
It lasted for 87 days while leaking vast amount of hydrocarbons and causing huge oil spill as 
well as damaging fauna and flora. The environmental impact of the blowout in the Gulf of 
Mexico is still being discussed and researched, the incident also traumatized the livelihood of 
many people. 
 
Therefore covering every aspect of the Macondo blowout is out of scope in this thesis. 
The GAP Analysis is performed based on a) the events leading to the blowout and b) their 
causes and effects. The aftermath of the blowout is out of scope in this master thesis. In the 
industry, GAP Analysis is an effective and cost efficient tool to identify key components, 
processes or procedures that need immediate attention or improvement. They are mainly 
used as a benchmark prior to maintenance activities, recertification or upgrading of existing 
system or part of a system.  It is usually performed for every item (section) of given 
recommended practice/ standard and codes.  
 
The Macondo blowout incident concerns many number of standard & codes, 
guidelines etc. Therefore showing the technical gaps of every item is vast and would not fit in 
the limitations of a master thesis. Therefore after examining all the relevant standards and 
codes, guidelines, recommended practices only the items /sections that are of major w.r.t. the 
Macondo blowout incident have been documented in this thesis. 
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I.2 Background 
On April 20, 2010, a mile beneath the ocean disaster struck following a series of events 
in the world’s biggest blowout, unfortunately eleven people perished and also several others 
were greatly injured in the initial explosion. Thirty six hours later the fire and explosion on the 
rig caused the rig to sink to the sea floor, hydrocarbons from the reservoir continued to flow 
in to the ocean. The release of hydrocarbons lasted for 87 days following the blowout.  
 
In March 2008, British Petroleum (BP) had received exclusive rights to drill  Mississippi 
Canyon Block 252 for over 34$ million from the Minerals Management Service (MMS), Block 
252 is a nine square mile plot in the Gulf of Mexico. Initially BP had planned to drill the well to 
a target depth of 20200 feet and the well was originally proposed to be an exploratory well 
and to be transformed to a production well if found viable[1]. 
 
The Macondo well gave BP numerous challenges from the start and posed an array of 
risks including high pore pressures, lost circulation events, selection of long string production 
casing versus liner tie back, choice and selection of centralizers and the risk of channelling 
during cementing, cement slurry design, well testing, temporary abandonment sequences.[1] 
 
The Macondo blowout was caused due to the well integrity failures which led to the 
loss of hydrostatic pressure on the well. The crucial failure of the BOP failing to shut the well 
in case of emergency ultimately caused gas to expand in the riser and form large gas cloud on 
the rig. This was followed by the initial explosion, resulting in unimaginable and traumatizing 
loss of life/injuries and one of the biggest environmental disaster in the world.  
I.3 Purpose 
The Macondo blowout is one of the worst disaster in the oil and gas industry history, 
causing human causalities and environmental pollution of great magnitude. Over the years, it 
has been a case study for HSE, maintenance and inspection. 
This thesis involves the GAP Analysis between the key findings & the causes of the 
Macondo blowout and their prescribed Recommended Practices, Guidelines, Standards and 
Codes. The tasks involve an exhaustive literature study on the various causes and effects of 
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the Macondo blowout incident and mapping them on to the respective standards & codes and 
analyzing the possible GAP between them. 
The main purposes of this thesis are as follows: 
1. Why did Macondo happen? 
2. What were the contributing events that led to the blowout? 
3. Standards and codes are used to give the operators and services companies, the 
minimum requirement that they should follow, did the companies follow the minimum 
standards? If yes, then were the minimum standards and codes wasn’t sufficient or 
outdated or does it need change? 
4. What are technical gaps between the operators’ / Service Company’s recommended 
practice and what they actually followed? 
5. Following the Macondo event, what are the changes that were made to Norwegian 
standard (NORSOK D-010) to avoid such an event in the NCS? 
6. Every operator/service companies have their own recommended practices, when an 
operation/task is performed. These involved companies now have their own 
recommended practices, usually the operator has the final say on the direction of the 
operation, but what are the worst case scenarios?  
7. What are the effects when a service company feels that an operator’s decision is 
against its own recommended practices and / or international regulations/guidelines? 
I.4 Study Methodology  
The following reports form the basis for the thesis: 
1. Deep Water: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling, Report to the 
President by National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill (2011) 
2. Final Report on the Investigation of the Macondo Well Blowout' by Deepwater 
Horizon Study Group (2011) 
3. The US Coast Guard (Uscg)/Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and 
Enforcement (Boemre) Joint Investigation Team (Jit) by Deepwater Horizon 
Incident Joint Investigation (2010) 
4. Deepwater Horizon Incident Joint Investigation by BP Incident Investigation Team 
(2011) 
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Secondary sources include recommended practices, guidelines, MMS regulations and 
International Standards and Codes which are referred to in the above reports. Other sources 
include articles, presentations, reports, websites which have been appropriately referenced 
as footnotes and/or end note citations along with references section at the end. 
II. Literature Review 
This chapter presents a brief review on the Macondo well design, which forms the basis 
for GAP Analysis study.  
II.1 Location 
The Macondo well is situated in the Mississippi canyon, it is a very vast oil rich area, 
where other numerous wells have successfully been drilled and produced prior to Macondo 
well. The Macondo well is situated in the block 252, about 65 km south east of the American 
state Louisiana, about 23 square km in area, see figure 1. 
 
Figure 1-Location of the Macondo Well 1    
                                                          
1 BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, Pg.15 
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II.2 Deepwater Horizon Arrives 
British Petroleum (BP) had been operating the Macondo well situated in the Mississippi 
Canyon in Block 252, they had contracted Transocean’s drill ship called the ‘Marianas’ for 
drilling operations, Marianas used an anchoring system with the help of mooring chains. 
In October 2009, the drilling of the Macondo well spudded2 with a water depth of 
almost 5000ft, the initial estimate of the reservoir was supposed to be 50-100 million barrels 
of crude. However the engineers had not made the relevant tests to confirm the size of the 
field or the actual reservoir estimation before the blowout in April 2010[2]. 
 
With almost 1$ million/day rig rate, BP had originally planned to complete drilling of 
the Macondo well in 51 days. In November 2009, the well was drilled up to the depth of 3000ft 
with the Marianas but following the event of hurricane Ida, the Marianas was damaged, 
disconnected and taken to shipyard for repairs. In January 2010, the Deepwater horizon from 
Transocean which was already on contract with BP was called to replace the damaged 
Marianas and after appropriate approval from the Mineral Management Service (MMS), 
further drilling continued from 6th February 2010[2].  
II.3 Safety System Employed on the Deepwater Horizon: 
II.3.1 Blowout preventer 
  The BOP (Figure 2) is a multi-layered stack of valves used as a drilling tool and as well 
as an emergency safety equipment typically weighing over hundreds of tons and primarily 
used to shut-in a well in the event of a well control issue such as kicks or if a sudden increase 
in wellbore pressures occurs. BOP primarily consisting of the following: 
 Annular Preventer- donut shaped rubbed seals around the outside of the pipe sealing                
the well see figure 3. 
 Variable Bore Rams- these are circular metal bars that when initiated seals the annulus 
of the pipe see figure 4. 
 Blind Shear Rams- when initiated these rams cut through the pipe and seals the well 
bore completely see figure 5. 
                                                          
2 The starting of drilling operations on a new well, usually referred to the drill bit hittin the seafloor. 
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Figure 2-Blowout Preventer3 
 
Figure 3-Annular Preventer4 
                                                          
3 Image Source: National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, Op. ct. 24. 
4 Image Source: National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, Op. ct. 24. 
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Figure 4-Variable Bore Ram (VSR)5 
 
Figure 5-Blind Shear Ram (BSR)6 
                                                          
5 Image Source: National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, Op. ct. 24. 
6 Image Source: National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, Op. ct. 24. 
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II.3.2 Emergency Disconnect System (EDS) 
In case of emergency, EDS can be activated by pressing on a switch located at any of 
the following a. driller’s control panel b. bridge c. subsea engineer control room. 
Communication signals are sent through the multiplex umbilical cables (MUX cables) to 
initiate the BSR to cut the pipe and seal the well. The hydraulic power to initiate the BSR comes 
from the hydraulic line (conduit) of the accumulator tank7 situated on the rig. The conduit also 
supplies hydraulic power to the control pods as well as to the accumulator on the lower BOP 
stack, see figure 6. Once initiated the BSR would seal the well and disconnect the lower marine 
riser package from the BOP and disengage the rig from any communication to the subsurface 
and any possible flow path, w.r.t blowout[3] . 
II.3.3 Automatic Mode Function (“Deadman System”) 
The automatic mode functions (AMF) also called the ‘Deadman system’ seal the well 
bore completely in case the BOP loses any kind of communication with the rig i.e. electrical 
lines, fiber optic communication, and hydraulic line from the rig, see Figure 6. This AMF has 
two separate control pods (blue and yellow) independent of each other connected to the 
accumulator bottles mounted on the lower BOP stack, it is capable of delivering around 
4000psi (pounds per square inch) to the blind shear rams to cut the pipe inside the BOP and 
seal the well bore. One of the most critical component of the control pods were the batteries 
used to deliver the necessary power in case of loss of communication (i.e. electrical power, 
hydraulic power) through the MUX cables from the rig and secondly the solenoid valves which 
trigger the delivery of 4000psi closing pressure to the BSR[3, 4]. 
 
                                                          
7 Accumulator tanks are situated on the surface rig, they are driven by two triplex pumps, these pumps store 
pressurized fluid and supply then via the hydraulic conduit/line to the accumulator bottles on the lower BOP 
stack, the accumulator bottle also has hydraulic communication to both the control pods. 
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Figure 6-Schematics and purpose of a BOP 8  
                                                          
8 Image Source Investigating the Cause of the Deepwater Horizon Blowout - Interactive Graphic - NYTimes.com, 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/06/21/us/20100621-bop.html [Accessed 27 May 2014] 
 
AMF Procedure 
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II.3.4 Diverter System 
When large amount of gas kick is seen above the BOP (i.e. in the riser) the gas expands 
exponentially and when gas expands it also takes a large amount of drilling mud along with it 
at very high rate. This in effect displaces the heavier drilling mud used to keep the hydrostatic 
overbalance on the formation. Kick occurrences are common, when they happen it should be 
safely dealt with. This is done by various methods the drillers are experienced with (i.e. drillers 
method, wait and weight method etc.). As a last line of defense in case of a kick above the 
BOP, the diverter system is employed. [5] 
 
Figure 7-Diverter System9 
                                                          
9 Image Source: National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Offshore Drilling, Macondo: The Gulf Oil 
Disaster, Chief Counsel's Report, 2011, Pg.195 
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In the Deepwater Horizon, the diverter system had two large 14inch diameter pipes as 
shown in figure 7, connected to the riser via a slip joint. The two diverter lines (starboard side 
and port side collectively called as overboard) go to the opposite side of the rig. On the 
starboard side of the diverter line there is a valve through which MGS system (mud gas 
separator system) is connected. The MSG system is a collection of valves, pipes, tanks, pits 
which is used to separate drilling mud and gas from the kick.[5] The maximum working 
pressure of the MGS system is 15psi, above which a relief line to starboard overboard  is 
opened through a bursting disk of 15psi, see figure 8. 
 
 
Figure 8-Deepwater Horizon Mud Gas Separator Schematics10 
                                                          
10 Image Source: Deepwater Horizon Study Group, Final report on the investigation of the Macondo well blowout, 2011, 
Pg.69 
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When there is a kick above the BOP, the drillers basically have two choices, they could 
either choose to let the kick go overboard or through the MGS system. MGS system is utilized 
for lower kick size, so that the gas bearing drilling mud can be separated safely. The expensive 
drilling mud can be reused while the gas is discharged safely through the flaring system on top 
of the derrick. When the larger kick occurs, the MGS would not be able to handle such large 
volume of gas bearing mud. In case the MGS is used for large volume of kick, large cloud of 
flammable gas builds up on the rig and could lead to ignition and explosion, so the kick has to 
be discharged overboard in to the sea.[5] 
In Deepwater horizon, the diverter packer situated on the top of the slip joint just below the 
rig had around 500psi working pressure. [5] 
II.4 Events Leading to the Blowout: 
II.4.1 Stuck Pipe  
In October 2009 the Macondo well experienced a kick during drilling operations 
followed by another kick on March 8th 2010 and resulted in a stuck pipe inside the wellbore. 
All attempts to pull the stuck pipe free failed. They had to side track the well around the stuck 
pipe to continue drilling. The well also experienced lost returns several times causing 
considerable delay in schedule and millions of dollar over budget[4]. 
II.4.2 Lost Circulation Event 
Lost circulation is the loss of drilling fluid in to the formation, the drilling mud instead 
of being circulated up the annulus, flows in to the formation. This could be due to natural 
fractures in the formation or overbalanced drilling see figure 9. 
 
18 
 
 
Figure 9-Lost Circulation11 
 
 
                                                          
11 Image Source: National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, Op. ct. 24. 
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Figure 10-Macondo Well Pore Pressure Fracture Gradient Plot12 
                                                          
12 Source: Investigation, D.H.I.J., The US Coast Guard (USCG)/Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation 
and Enforcement (BOEMRE) Joint Investigation Team (JIT). 2010. Pg.29 
Reducing 
drilling margin 
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Figure 11-Macondo Well- Actual Casing design and setting depth13 
                                                          
13 Image Source: BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report,  Pg.19 
Reducing Pore 
Pressure in the 
payzone  
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According to BOEMRE14 regulations, drilling mud should typically be at least 0.2 ppg 
(pounds per gallon) above the pore pressure (pp) of the formation to stop the influx of 
hydrocarbons in to the well and at least 0.5ppg less than the fracture gradient to stop 
uncontrolled mud loss in to the formation. As seen on figures 10, 11 from 17000 ft. onwards 
the drilling margin had become very small for BP and from figure 12 BP had lost up to 4000 
barrels of drilling mud (between ~17000 feet and ~18000 feet) in to the formation. Therefore 
this limited the total well depth to 18360 ft. less than the originally planned 20200 ft. This also 
led BP to change the well casing program. 
 
 
Figure 12-Drilling margin and Lost circulation data15 
The drilling company Transocean dealt with the lost circulation by pumping down the 
kill pills (circulation control pills) and controlled the incident. This incident played a pivotal role 
in shaping the direction of BP and the service companies’ w.r.t operations and incidents that 
followed.  
                                                          
 
14 On October 1, 2011, the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE), 
formerly the Minerals Management Service (MMS), was replaced by the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management 
(BOEM) and the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) as part of a major reorganization. 
http://www.boemre.gov/ [Accessed 24 May 2014] 
15 Investigation, D.H.I.J., The US Coast Guard (USCG)/Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and 
Enforcement (BOEMRE) Joint Investigation Team (JIT). 2010. Pg.29 
Reducing Pore Pressure from 14.1 ppg to 
12.6 ppg and the mud weight used to drill 
as well as the losses which occured 
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II.4.3 Revised total depth and choice of casing string 
Following the lost circulation events described above, BP and Transocean controlled 
the mud loss by LCM pills and decided to install the 9 7/8’’ casing at 17168’ from the original 
19650’, see figure 14. BP continued to drill the open hole section for the production casing 
and faced difficulties with the drilling margin (see figure 10), from 17168’ (9 7/8’’ casing shoe) 
to 18223’ where the pore pressure kept reducing from 14.1 ppg to 12.6ppg,  
 
Figure 13-Macondo Well Shoe Track and Hydrocarbon Intervals16 
Therefore the drilling mud equivalent circulating density (usually 14.1+ 0.2 ppg above 
pore pressure)  was fracturing at the bottom of open hole interval (12.6 ppg pore pressure) 
while overbalancing the top of the open hole interval (14.1 ppg pore pressure). Figuratively 
                                                          
16 Image Source: Investigation, Deepwater Horizon Incident Joint, The US Coast Guard (USCG)/Bureau of Ocean 
Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE) Joint Investigation Team (JIT), Pg. 36 
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BP and the service companies ran out of drilling margin, so decided to revise the total well 
depth at 18360’ from the original well total depth of 20200’. 
 
Figure 14-Geology, Original Well Design and Installed Depth17 
At 18360’ the wellbore was still inside the primary sandstone reservoir see figure 14, 
which forced BP to reconsider their original long casing string design (“ a “long string“ 
production casing—a single continuous wall of steel between the wellhead on the seafloor, 
and the oil and gas zone at the bottom of the well”[1]). They had two options, see figure 15, 
one was to go with the originally planned long string production casing and the other a shorter 
string called a liner tie back production casing string (“ a “liner”—a shorter string of casing 
hung lower in the well and anchored to the next higher string”[1] ). 
 
                                                          
17 Image Source: Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, BP, Pg. 16 
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Figure 15-Long string, Liner and Liner with Tieback18 
A liner tie back string is expensive and although it provides two additional well barrier 
(i.e. the liner has to be sealed to the previous 9 7/8’’ casing by a packer as well a seal assembly 
at the tie back junction, figure 15) to hydrocarbon flow path, it has risks w.r.t mechanical 
integrity failure at the tie back junction, increased annular pressure build-up due to fluid 
expansion by heat transfer during production (the annulus of the 7’’ liner string is sealed at 
top by the tie-back seal assembly and casing shoe at the bottom, therefore if there is a the 
pressure build-up, there are no means to bleed off) [4]. 
Therefore BP had asked their cementing contractor Halliburton to also perform an 
analysis of a long string cemented using a nitrogen foam cement (more on cementing follows) 
with 6 centralizers (BP originally planned to use 21 centralizers, but only 6 were available on 
Deepwater)[4] .  
                                                          
18 Image Source: BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, Op. ct. 12, p75 
Two additional well barriers,  
i.e. packer and seal assembly 
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Halliburton reported that the long string with 15 centralizers could have a) cement 
channeling problems b) moderate gas flow problems and most importantly c) damage the 
formation during cementing due to abrupt change in pore pressure from 14.1 ppg to 12.6 ppg 
as discussed earlier. This is one of the reasons why BP chose the nitrogen foam cement mix, 
they then switched to a liner tie back string solution with 15 centralizers19. The primary 
cement job in a liner is much easier due to successful cement lift due itself to lower ECD20. 
Finally BP evaluated and called on an in-house BP cementing expert  to evaluate both the 
options and finally with certain changes to cementing parameters decided to go with the long 
string producing casing (7inch at the bottom tapered to 9 5/8inch at the top)[2, 4] 
II.4.4 Centralizers 
“A device fitted with a hinged collar and bowsprings to keep the casing or liner in the 
center of the wellbore to help ensure efficient placement of a cement sheath around the 
casing string. If casing strings are cemented off-center, there is a high risk that a channel of 
drilling fluid or contaminated cement will be left where the casing contacts the formation, 
creating an imperfect seal”21, see figure 16. 
BP had planned to use 21 centralizers for its long string casing design, they had only six 
centralizers with built in stop collars22 available on Deepwater and therefore ordered 
additional fifteen from Weatherford. BP had again asked Halliburton to analyze the design of 
the long string with six centralizers (Halliburton actually analyzed with seven centralizers, for 
unknown reason). 
                                                          
19 BP, “Forward Plan Review” [internal, undated] Source: Investigation, Deepwater Horizon Incident Joint, 
The US Coast Guard (USCG)/Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement 
(BOEMRE) Joint Investigation Team (JIT), Sep 2011, Pg. 37 
 
 
21 Schlumberger Website, Oilfield Glossary, Accessed: May 28 2014, Ref: 
http://www.glossary.oilfield.slb.com/en/Terms/c/centralizer.aspx 
 
22 Stop collars are used to restrict the movement of the centralizers, they are either built on to the centralizer 
already made or can be strapped on the centralizer separately. 
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Figure 16-Centralizers23 
BP received the fifteen centralizers and found that they were of the wrong type with 
separate stop collars and decided to go ahead with just using the six that were available on 
the rig. Before receiving the analysis report from Halliburton, BP installed the long casing string 
with six centralizers, the report ( BP received the final report after the blowout) concluded 
that severe gas flow problems were likely to occur, the report also contained vital compressive 
strength analysis of the cement[1, 4] . 
 
                                                          
23 Deepwater Horizon Study Group, Final report on the investigation of the Macondo well blowout, Centre for 
Catastrophic Risk Management, University of California at Berkeley. 2011 Pg. 33 
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II.4.5 Cementing 
II.4.5.1 Slurry Design 
Only a few days before completing the drilling of the well, BP and Transocean had to 
do one of the most important jobs to perform, i.e. cementing the casing, also called the 
primary cement job. They had contracted Halliburton to perform the cement job for the 
casing.  
BP and Halliburton had decided to use the cutting edge nitrogen foam technology for 
the cement job, which was back then the latest technology with some or no actual field 
history. In the nitrogen foam technology, cement mix has nitrogen gas in it to reduce the 
density of the cement mix without compensating the strength. This was a very interesting 
decision since, given the previous lost circulation event and the challenging drilling 
window/margin, BP did not want to have any more well control incidents and possibly decided 
to go ahead with the new technology that promised to work without damaging the formation. 
But the nitrogen foam technology in its inception had some controversial lab test reports done 
by Halliburton which showed that the foam cement was mostly unstable except for the last 
test which showed the contrary[1].  
BP and Halliburton performed the cement job and assumed that they had a good 
primary cement job, therefore did not perform crucial (not mandatory) test i.e. cement bond 
logging (CBL) test. The CBL was supposed to be done by Schlumberger crew, who were already 
available on the rig but BP sent the Halliburton and Schlumberger technicians home 
immediately following the cement job. This already set the stage for a gas leak and a 
potentially blowout in the making. 
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II.4.5.2 Full Displacement Vs Partial Displacement 
 
Figure 17-Illustration of conventional Bottoms up VS what BP did24 
It is widely accepted in the industry to perform a full bottoms up of the well bore prior 
to primary cementing. Full bottoms up circulation of the wellbore would clean the annulus 
from any drilling cut debris and stops contamination of the cement see figure 17. It is done by 
pumping base oil, spacer and cement mix into the well, to displace the existing drilling mud all 
the way to the trip tank on the rig see figure 18. The mud-logger can perform useful tests to 
examine the drilling mud for any residual hydrocarbons in case the formation was flowing 
                                                          
24 Deepwater Horizon Study Group, Final report on the investigation of the Macondo well blowout, Centre for 
Catastrophic Risk Management, University of California at Berkeley. 2011 Pg. 37 
 
29 
 
already in the wellbore. But BP, given the fact of the previous washout and the lost circulation 
materials used to plug the formation, were concerned and decided to only perform a partial 
displacement of the drilling mud. ‘’BP circulated approximately 350 barrels of mud before 
cementing, rather than the 2,760 barrels needed to do a full bottoms up circulation.[1]”  
Figure 18-Cement Fluid Locations25 
 
 
                                                          
25 Deepwater Horizon Study Group, Final report on the investigation of the Macondo well blowout, Centre for 
Catastrophic Risk Management, University of California at Berkeley. 2011 Pg. 37 
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The flow rate at which the cement mix is to be pumped is very important. Higher flow 
rate means increased cement and is synonyms with a good cement job, on the down side it 
also causes increased pump pressure resulting in increased ECD, which might lead to lost 
circulation/formation damage. BP were concerned. 
 
Additionally, BP used only 60 barrels of cement mix to cement 500ft above the 
uppermost hydrocarbon bearing zone and 800ft for the principal hydrocarbon zone. This is 
considered as a relatively low volume to give a good cement placement (that more cement 
volume means less contamination and an increased efficiency). But BP chose to use only the 
bare minimum volume of cement with a slight margin for error. Increased cement volume 
causes higher PPG exerted on the annulus of the liner/casing shoe, potentially causing damage 
to the formation[1]. Therefore BP decided to do only a partial displacement 500ft above the 
payzone. A comparison of partial displacement vs full displacement is shown in figure 17. 
 
It is to be noted that a wiper plug is used to separate the cement and spacer from 
contamination while it is being pumped in to the casing. Bottom wiper plug separates the cap 
cement and spacer whereas top wiper plug separates the spacer and tail cement mix see 
figure 18, the wiper plug has a inbuilt disc which should be burst between 900 psi to 1100psi 
to allow cement circulation, the bottom wiper plug actually burst at 2900psi[4] (it can be 
identified by an abrupt spike in the pump pressure reading) 
 
II.4.5.3 Float Collars 
Float collars are double-check valves on the top of a casing shoe or at the bottom of a 
casing string, see figure 19. When activated/converted it only allows flow through one 
direction and stops back-flow. In the Macondo well, BP used a Weatherford Model M45AP 
(see Appendix D) mid-bore auto-fill float collar[4]. There is an auto fill tube inside the float 
collars which keeps the two flapper valves held open by default. When the final production 
casing is run in to the well it results in excess volume (increased ppg) of the casing and 
therefore the equivalent drilling mud has to be removed/displaced. This is done by displacing 
the excess volume (increased volume due to running the casing) through the circulating ports 
in the auto fill tube. Once the casing is run and set, the base oil, spacer and cement mix are 
pumped in to the casing and up in to the annulus of the liner through flow ports at the bottom 
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Figure 19-Float Collar conversion26. 
                                                          
26 Deepwater Horizon Study Group, Final report on the investigation of the Macondo well blowout, Centre for 
Catastrophic Risk Management, University of California at Berkeley. 2011 Pg. 35 
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of the casing shoe as shown in figure 19. Once the required Top of Cement (TOC) is reached 
the casing is pressurized from the rig at an optimal flow rate to convert the float collars (the 
increasing pressure displaces the auto fill tube into the shoe track27 below, this closes the 
flapper valves). In case the float collar does not convert (the auto fill tube is not displaced), 
the flapper valves are still held open and reverse flow is possible i.e. flow from the annulus of 
the liner, this reverse flow could be cement or drilling mud or even hydrocarbons in case the 
cement is contaminated and/or did not set in place. 
 
In Macondo, after the cement was pumped in to the annulus, the casing was 
pressurized to convert the float collar, but BP noticed that the casing shoe at the bottom could 
be plugged. According to Weatherford specifications the float collar should convert around 
500-700psi (see appendix D) but BP, only on their ninth attempt, managed to finally convert 
the float collar at a whopping 3142 psi at a flow rate of around 4 bpm (weather ford 
specifications say 5-7 bpm, see appendix D). In any case they were not even sure if the float 
collar had actually been converted.  
II.4.6 Temporary Abandonment before disengaging Deepwater Horizon 
After the cementing operations, the well was due for temporary abandonment28. In 
order to do this, the Deepwater Horizon had to a) remove the BOP and the riser from the 
wellbore b) set a cement plug well below the seabed and c) put in a lock down sleeve on the 
well head. Lock down sleeve is used to keep the existing casing hanger and the seal assembly 
from moving out of place, the movement can be caused when high pressure fluids are flowing 
upwards in turn lifting the casing. Figure 20 shows the Status of the well before and after 
temporary abandonment. 
 
                                                          
27 Shoe track is the space between the float collar at the top and the casing shoe at the bottom, typically filled 
with cement and acts as a well barrier element 
28 Temporary abandonment is the procedure in which expensive drilling rigs disengage from operations prior to 
completions and production so that cheaper and smaller production rigs are brought in to perform further 
operations 
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Figure 20-Status of the well before (left) and after temporary abandonment (right) with the 
cement plug29 
BP decided to put the cement plug at 3300ft below the sea floor (8367ft from the rig) 
on contrary to 6000ft originally planned. they also decided to put the lock down sleeve after 
the surface cement plug is set and not vice versa as originally planned[1].  
 
 
                                                          
29 Image Source: National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, Report to the 
President, 2011. Pg. 103 
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The following figure shows the sequence of operations BP planned for the temporary 
abandonment in the Macondo well. 
 
 
Figure 21- BP’s Temporary abandonment sequence 30 
II.4.6.1 Well Testing 
Before the well is to be handed over to completions well testing should be performed 
i.e. the Positive pressure testing (PPT) and Negative pressure testing (NPT). They are done to 
test the integrity of the well barrier i.e. testing the cement job, wellhead hanger seal etc. In 
accordance with the temporary abandonment plan as explained before, positive and negative 
pressure test were conducted by BP as follows. 
 
II.4.6.1.1 Positive Pressure test 
In a positive pressure test, pressure is built up in the well by pumping additional fluids, 
to check if the pressure is sustained over a period of time. In case there is a leak in the barrier 
envelope, the pressure will not stay constant over time. BP pumped the well to 250 psi and 
waited for 5 minutes and then pressured again up to 2500psi and watched for 30 minutes, see 
figure 22. 
                                                          
30 Source: National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, Report to the President, 
2011. Pg. 104 
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Figure 22-Positive Pressure Test31 (Macondo Real time data) 
The pressure inside the pipe was stable and constant. The positive pressure testing was 
considered adequate and conclusive. 
II.4.6.1.2 Negative Pressure Test 
Unlike the positive pressure testing, in a negative pressure test, the well is actually 
made to flow, in other words the well is underbalanced. This also checks for the well barrier 
integrity.  
The negative pressure test is conducted by displacing heavy drilling mud in the casing 
with seawater, since seawater is of lower density and replacing heavier drilling mud causes 
lower hydrostatic pressure on the formation, thus stimulating underbalanced conditions, in 
effect replicates conditions viable for flow from the formation in to the well bore, if the 
primary cement and the casing shoe had a good cement job, the well should not see any flow 
                                                          
31 Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, BP, 2011 pg. 83 
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in spite of being underbalanced. This was the only real test to check the integrity of the casing 
shoe and also to check if the formation is already flowing in to the well bore. 
 
 
Figure 23-Negative Pressure Test32 
 
 
                                                          
32 Image Source: National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Offshore Drilling, Macondo: The 
Gulf Oil Disaster, Chief Counsel's Report, 2011. Pg 141 
37 
 
 
Figure 24-Valves and Lines in a Negative Pressure Test33 
To conduct the negative pressure test see figure (23), first BP closes and runs the drill 
pipe to 8367ft followed by pumping of spacer and seawater through the drill pipe, the sea 
water displaces the heavier drilling mud. There are choke, kill and boost lines accelerates the 
pumping of seawater and removes drilling mud faster, see figure (24). Once this is 
accomplished it is followed by closing off the annular preventer in the BOP (choke, boost and 
kill line are also closed). This is very crucial to note, since the annular preventer removes the 
hydrostatic pressure of the column of drilling mud and spacer in the riser (5037ft above the 
mud line).  
 
                                                          
33 Image Source: National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Offshore Drilling, Macondo: The 
Gulf Oil Disaster, Chief Counsel's Report, 2011. Pg 149 
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After the annular preventer is shut in, the valve in the drill pipe is opened to release 
the pent-up pressure (bleed-off any unreleased pressure) and the well is made to flow and 
finally the drill pipe pressure34 is brought to 0psi (because the drill pipe is open to atmospheric 
pressure). Once the drill pipe pressure is brought to zero psi, the drill pipe valve is closed along 
with the kill line valve  
For a successful negative pressure test, after initial flow in the drill pipe (due to pent 
up pressure), the pressure before and after shut in should be zero psi, with little or no fluid 
flow.  
The first negative pressure test in Macondo showed a sign of problem, after initial 
bleed off, the pressure in the well could never be brought towards zero i.e. the drill pipe 
pressure stayed at 260psi and also returned water to the rig. Following this, the rig crew shut 
the drill pipe valve and observed 1262psi, first negative test failed[5]. See figure 25. 
Meanwhile, the rig crew noticed falling spacer level in the riser so dedicated to close 
the annular preventer tight and perform the second negative test, during the second test the 
drill pipe pressure was bled to 0psi but the drill pipe returned around 15 barrels of fluid, 
unusually large volume, following the bleed-off the drill pipe was shut in again only to see the 
pressure shot up to 773psi, the second negative pressure testing failed[5].  
 
                                                          
34 The drill pipe pressure should be equal to the kill line pressure during the negative pressure test, as both the 
lines are connected to the same vessel in the BOP and experience the same pressure. 
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Figure 25-Negative Pressure test35 (Macondo Real time data) 
                                                          
35 Source: Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, BP, 2011 pg. 88 
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Finally BP decided to bleed off the pressure using the kill line instead of the drill pipe 
during the third negative pressure test, on the third NPT, they had open kill line valve and 
managed to bring the pressure down to 0psi but this resulted in excessive flow through the 
kill line as well, when the kill line was shut in, the drill pipe pressure again shot up to 1400psi. 
Evidently the third test had also failed, it was actually a symptom of the bad cement job and 
that the hydrocarbons have actually started to leak (the reservoir pressure was around 
1400psi). Since they had an anomaly in the tests from different pipes (i.e. drill pipe, kill line), 
they decided to ignore the sign on the false pretense based on bladder effect/ false echo and 
continued further while declaring that the third negative pressure testing as successful[5].  
Negative Pressure 
Test (NPT) 
Drill pipe/kill line, 
Bleed off Pressure 
(psi) 
Flow out Volume Drill pipe/kill line, 
Shut in Pressure(psi) 
First NPT 260 excessive 1262  on drill pipe and 
kill line 
Second NPT 0 excessive 773  on drill pipe and 
killl line 
Thrid NPT 0 excessive 1400  on drill pipe and 
0  on kill line36 
Summary of the negative pressure tests at Macondo well. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
36 The kill line pressure and drill pipe pressure should have been the same, the 0 psi pressure might possibly be 
due to the kill line being plugged on the third attempt to show. this 0 psi on the kill line was the reason the BP 
and Transocean crew declared the third negative pressure test a success. 
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III. GAP Analysis 
This chapter deals with the GAP analysis of the Macondo blowout with their prescribed Standards 
and Codes, Regulations, Guidelines and Recommended Practices. This Chapter investigates and 
analyzes the major technical gaps of the Deepwater Horizon. First section deals with highlighting the 
well-established standards and codes that were used to perform the GAP Analysis, second section 
contains the technical gaps between the operator / Service Company’s recommended practice 
and what they actually followed and the Third section contains the changes that were made to 
Norwegian standard (NORSOK D-010) to avoid such an event in the NCS 
III.1 Petroleum Industry Standards 
“The petroleum and natural gas industries use a great number of standards developed 
by industry organisations, through national and regional standardisation bodies, by the 
individual companies in the industries and by international standards bodies. The use of these 
standards enhances technical integrity, improves safety, reduces environmental damage, and 
promotes business efficiencies that result in reduced costs. The current, intensified period of 
international standards development reflects the global nature of the industry and the 
imperative to operate more effectively and reduce costs further. International standards for 
the petroleum and natural gas industries is the area that is the focus of the International 
Association of Oil & Gas Producers (OGP) through its Standards Committee[6]” . 
The following guidelines, recommended practices, regulations, standards and codes 
are of critical importance for the GAP Analysis. 
III.1.1 NORSOK Standard 
“NORSOK standard is developed with broad petroleum industry participation by 
interested parties in the Norwegian petroleum industry and is owned by the Norwegian 
petroleum industry represented by The Norwegian Oil Industry Association (OLF) and 
Federation of Norwegian Manufacturing Industries (TBL)[7]” . 
 
III.1.1.1 NORSOK D-010- “Well integrity in drilling and well operations” 
The NORSOK D-010 is an important Norwegian Standard and Code for operators and 
service companies, it deals with well barrier design, risk assessment, drilling activities, well 
testing operations, completion operations, production & well intervention activities and 
acceptance criteria for various drilling and well operations. 
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III.1.2 API RP 65- “Isolating Potential Flow Zones During Well Construction” 
API RP 65 is an important standard and code for the cementing operations, post 
cement job activities as well as casing shoe testing.  
III.1.3 MMS Regulations (Pre-Macondo) 
Minerals Management Service (MMS) was the US government administrative agency 
in charge of leasing, auditing, inspection etc. It is similar to the NPD (Norwegian Petroleum 
Directorate) in Norway. They had various regulations set forth for operators / service 
companies’ w.r.t petroleum exploration, drilling, completions, production and abandonment. 
III.1.4 BP/Transocean’s Recommended Practices 
BP and other service companies have their own internal recommended practices and 
guidelines for every operations in the petroleum industry. These guidelines are substantially 
based on their own experience within the industry. The companies in addition to their 
guidelines also use other relevant, well established Standards and Codes in conjunction with 
their own guidelines. 
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III.2 GAP Assessment 
III.2.1 Technical GAPs between Deepwater Horizon Blowout Incident Vs Various 
International Regulations / Standards & Codes 
The Following GAP Analysis focuses on highlighting what BP and other service 
companies actually followed in the Macondo well prior to April 20th Blowout while mapping 
them to the relevant Mineral Management Service Regulations, API Standards and Code, 
British Petroleum’s Internal Standards, Transocean’s Internal Standards, whenever applicable. 
 
 
 
NOTE: 
The main sources for the following GAP analysis includes  
1) Literature review of this thesis  
2) All the footnotes included in this thesis,  
3) References section of this thesis  
4) Color denotes that recommendation; 
 
For example 
1 : is a High Impact GAP 
 
2: is a Medium Impact GAP 
 
3: is a Low Impact GAP 
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III.2.2 Technical GAPs between NORSOK D-010 Revision 3, 2004 Vs NORSOK D-010 
Revision 4, 2013 (Post-Macondo Blowout) 
Following the Macondo Blowout on April 20th 2010,  Standards Norway (NORSOK) has 
made drastic changes to the D-010 (Well integrity in drilling and well operations) to avoid 
such calamities in the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) as well as to safe guard the high 
Health, Safety and Environmental (HSE) standards of Norway. The following tables performs 
the GAP analysis by showing the changes / updates of NORSOK D-010 (Revision 3, 2004) which 
existed before the Macondo Blowout and NORSOK D D-010 (Revision 4, 2013) which was 
revised post-Macondo. 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: 
The main sources for the following GAP analysis includes  
1) Literature review of this thesis  
2) All the footnotes included in this thesis,  
3) References section of this thesis  
4) Color denotes that recommendation; 
 
For example 
1 : is a High Impact GAP 
 
2: is a Medium Impact GAP 
 
3: is a Low Impact GAP 
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III.3 Major Investigations presented in the GAP Analysis 
The table below shows the major investigations performed in this thesis, it highlights 
the item number of the GAP analysis (chapter III.2, Page 44-68), and the operations that were 
performed in the respective item number along with the GAP Analysis Impact. It also highlights 
the Operations Impact that caused the blowout. Only the items 1-17 of the GAP analysis were 
the direct causes of the Macondo blowout. Items 18-29 are the changes that were made in 
the NORSOK to prevent the blowout from happening in the NCS. 
 
Item 
number 
of the 
GAP 
Analysis 
above 
Operations  
GAP 
Analysis 
Impact 
1 Revised total depth and choice of casing string Low 
2 Cementing (Cement evaluation, CBL) High 
3 NPT (Negative Pressure Test) Medium 
4 Cementing (Centralizers, cement slurry design) High 
5 Cementing (annular tolerance) Medium 
6 Cementing (Float collar conversion) Medium 
7 NPT High 
8 Diverter system High 
9 Temporary abandonment (Placement of cement plug) High 
10 NPT Medium 
11 Cementing (OptiCem analysis report) High 
12 BOP (Function testing) High 
13 Cementing (high density fluid in the 'rathole') High 
14 Cementing (Compressive strength analysis) High 
15 Cementing (OptiCem analysis report) Medium 
16 Cementing (Float collar conversion) Medium 
17 Cementing (Partial displacement) High 
    
60%  High Impact GAPs 
35% Medium Impact 
GAPs 
5% Low 
Impact 
GAPs 
60 %  due to Cementing 
17% due to 
NPT 
23% due to 
Others 
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IV. Discussion 
To be able to understand the Deepwater Horizon incident, it is necessary to start with 
the complexity of the well, the Macondo well was not an easy well to drill. BP and its service 
companies (collectively called as ‘companies’ henceforth) in spite of being one of the front 
runners in the industry, faced immeasurable challenges in the Macondo well. The stuck pipe 
incident on the 8th April 2010 set the foundation for the major technical challenges that the 
companies would face in the future. The incident caused BP to side track the well, pushing 
them behind schedule. This was followed by many lost circulation events that the companies 
faced until they had reached the ~17000 feet towards the sandstone reservoir. From 17000ft 
onwards the well turned out be increasingly problematic.  
 
BP had lost around 4000 barrels of expensive drilling mud in the open-hole interval 
from 17000 feet to 18000 feet, where the drilling margin ran out. This caused BP to 
prematurely set the total well depth. The revised well depth was inside the actual pay zone 
and it was against BP’s own internal policy, but there was an exemption to this policy if there 
were any prior circulation losses while drilling as well as if the well had ‘zero drilling margin’.  
 
Following the revision of the total well depth, BP had to choose between a ‘long string’ 
production casing versus a ‘short string’ production liner tie-back casing. BP had decided to 
use the long string based on concerns that the short string would cause mechanical integrity 
problems at the tie back junction along with annular pressure built up. It is vital to note that 
the short string would have given BP two additional well barriers, but BP chose a long string 
on the balance of possibilities. The long string casing gave Halliburton (cementing contractor) 
serious challenges via reduced annular tolerance for cementing.  
 
Given the fact of the lost circulation events along with the reducing drilling margin from 
14.1 ppg (PP at ~17000ft) to 12.6 ppg (PP at ~18000ft) and the reduced annular tolerance, the 
companies had very few choices and decided to use an unproved nitrogen foam cement slurry 
with reduced density, which was considered to be just as strong as any other conventional 
cement slurry.  
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Additionally, BP chose to ignore the Halliburton’s report that said with seven 
centralizers, the cement job would cause gas flow problems, which is even discussed as a main 
requirement in NORSOK D-010 standard. BP had performed a partial displacement of the 
drilling mud prior to cement job instead of a full displacement to the rig. The full displacement 
could have effectively cleaned the hole by removing the debris and providing smooth wellbore 
contact. It is possible that the partial displacement had suspended debris and led to 
channeling of the cement job that followed. This was a compromise against API 65 
Recommended practices. 
 
By this time, BP was behind schedule and any subsequent problems would just add 
fuel to fire, but the Macondo well was unforgiving, it kept throwing challenges to BP who were 
way behind schedule and increasingly drifting away from the budget. Furthermore, BP 
proceeded to convert the float collar of the casing shoe without receiving a compressive 
strength analysis from Halliburton that they had ordered. But before they were in actual 
possession of the report they proceeded forward, the compressive strength report would 
have given valuable information on the current state of the cement column (i.e. thickening 
time, Waiting on Cement etc.) which is a requirement in API 65. Also, if there had been any 
contamination of the cement slurry from the lighter drilling mud in the rat hole, it could have 
been inferred from the report. It is also unknown why BP did not follow the API 65 regulation, 
which clearly directs the companies to use higher weight fluid in the rat hole. It is possible that 
BP, given the state of the complex well bore issues (lost circulation events, zero drilling margin, 
uncertain cement slurry etc.), were worried about the formation damage. In addition to this, 
it is also crucial to remember that the wiper plug disc burst at 2900psi instead of 900psi-
1100psi. 
 
The float collar conversion at the end of the cement job did not go as planned, BP 
compromised on multiple parameters here as well. According to Weatherford specifications 
the float collar was supposed to convert at 500-700 psi at an optimal flow rate of 5-7 bpm but 
BP noticed to have converted at a staggering 3142psi at just 4 bpm. It is also not confirmed 
whether the float collar had indeed been converted. Interestingly, BP did not use higher flow 
rate, perhaps in view of increased ECD damaging the formation, which was in effect a 
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compromise from the API 65 Regulations as well as Weatherford specification. Pressuring the 
casing at 3142 psi could have also damaged the annular cement.  
 
Following the primary cementing, BP performed temporary abandonment sequence, 
which mainly included the setting of the cement plug, negative pressure test and placing a 
lock down sleeve. According to MMS regulations, the cement plug should be set not more 
than 1000 feet below the mudline during temporary abandonment. But BP chose to place the 
cement plug at 3300 feet below the mudline, which also meant displacing 3300 feet of heavy 
drilling mud with seawater. BP, according to its original plan, could have chosen to place the 
lock down sleeve before displacing the drilling mud. This could have acted as an additional 
well barrier.  
 
The negative pressure test (NPT) was one of the most important symptoms that the 
well was in fact flowing. Since there wasn’t any concrete regulatory clarification on the 
procedure or even on how to verify the results of the negative pressure test, BP had no means 
to benchmark its negative pressure test. Although BP had no means to benchmark the results 
with any regulatory guidelines, they could have followed Mr. Lindner’s procedure on negative 
pressure test on the dot (see Chapter III.2.1, #7). Had they followed Mr. Lindner’s procedure, 
they would not have done the third NPT on the kill line before clarifying with BP-onshore 
experts and likely found that the well was indeed flowing.  
 
Finally when the kick started moving above the BOP as a result of the BOP failure, BP 
tried to discharge the kick through the mud gas separator instead of overboard in to the sea. 
This led to gas cloud built up and ignition followed by explosion. BP’s internal guideline 
instructs rig crew to discharge large kick size overboard. Although the working pressure of the 
diverter packer is 500psi, much lower than the 1400psi formation pressure, it could have 
provided sufficient time to evacuate the rig crew. Eleven people could have been saved.  
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V. Conclusion  
From this thesis it is possible to see the serious of events that led to the Macondo disaster 
and the worst case scenarios of such events, in spite of the various safety systems employed 
to prevent such a disastrous blowout. BP and its service companies took many major decisions 
which involved a lot of risks, assumptions and non-compliance of regulatory guidelines, 
including in-house recommended policies. Each such event snowballed with the subsequent 
event and resulted in the eventual blowout.  
 
The Macondo well gave many signs and symptoms of the blowout, but the lack of oversight 
and preparedness of the decision makers contributed greatly to the blowout. It can be seen 
that the companies involved compromised greatly on the safety and made decisions on 
uncertainty. They did not follow the standards and code on many occasions. Even though Post-
Macondo many of the standards & codes, guidelines and recommended practices were 
revised and updated significantly, the blowout could have been avoided if the companies had 
followed the guidelines, Standards & Codes that existed Pre-Macondo. 
 
The Macondo blowout could have been avoided. The most important cause of the blowout 
is ‘Human Errors’. The various regulatory guidelines, standards and codes exist to keep the 
petroleum industry in view with health, safety and environment. Although they exist, they are 
only a minimum benchmark. It is in hands of the operators and service companies to follow 
Best Available and Safest Technology (BAST).  
 
From the Major Investigations (see Chapter III.3 Page 69), it is evident that 60% of the 
technical GAPs that caused the Blowout were of HIGH Impact, followed by medium impact 
GAPs at 35% and low impact GAPs at 5%. Additionally, 60% of the technical GAPS were due 
to Cementing, followed by 17% due to Negative Pressure Test and 23% for other activities. 
 
From this thesis, it is evident that BP and its service companies made substantial 
compromises with respect to regulations and guidelines, some of which were their own 
internal recommended practices. I would like to remind this famous internet quote “Hope for 
the best, plan for the worst”. 
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Appendices A 
Summary of decisions made by BP and other Service companies
 
(National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, Deep water: the Gulf oil disaster and the future of 
offshore drilling, Report to President, 2011. Pg. 125) 
79 
 
Appendices B 
Decisions made during the Macondo well drilling and completion that increased risks
 
(Investigation, Deepwater Horizon Incident Joint, The US Coast Guard (USCG)/Bureau of Ocean Energy 
Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE) Joint Investigation Team (JIT), 2010, Pg.85) 
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Appendices C 
STANDARDS FOR DRILLING, WELL CONSTRUCTION AND WELL 
OPERATIONS, RELEVANT TO THE MACONDO ACCIDENTS  
Source: Robert Baligira, The effect of Macondo Blowout on Risk Analysis and Risk Management, 2013, Master’s 
thesis, University of Stavanger, Pg. 98 
I. Engineering design, systems & equipment related documents:  
 
Above table is done by ‘Robert Baligira’ adapted from (ISO/TC 67 MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE AHG INDUSTRY EVENTS 
(ISO/TC 67 MC N088), MARCH 1ST, 2011, OGP INTERNATIONAL ASSOCATIONS OF OIL &GAS PRODUCERS, NOVEMBER 2012) 
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II. Management related documents:  
Source: Robert Baligira, The effect of Macondo Blowout on Risk Analysis and Risk Management, 2013, Master’s thesis, 
University of Stavanger, Pg. 98 
 
 
Above table is done by ‘Robert Baligira’ adapted from (ISO/TC 67 MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE AHG INDUSTRY 
EVENTS (ISO/TC 67 MC N088), MARCH 1ST, 2011, OGP INTERNATIONAL ASSOCATIONS OF OIL &GAS 
PRODUCERS, NOVEMBER 2012) 
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III. Documents in development  
Source: Robert Baligira, The effect of Macondo Blowout on Risk Analysis and Risk Management, 2013, Master’s 
thesis, University of Stavanger, Pg. 98 
 
 
 
Above table is done by ‘Robert Baligira’ adapted from (ISO/TC 67 MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE AHG INDUSTRY 
EVENTS (ISO/TC 67 MC N088), MARCH 1ST, 2011, OGP INTERNATIONAL ASSOCATIONS OF OIL &GAS 
PRODUCERS, NOVEMBER 2012) 
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Appendices D 
Weatherford Float Collar M45AP Specification: 
 
 
Source: MDL 2179 Trial Docs, [Online] Available:   
http://www.mdl2179trialdocs.com/releases/release201304041200022/TREX-02562.pdf [Accessed 
30/05/2014] 
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Source: MDL 2179 Trial Docs, [Online] Available:  
http://www.mdl2179trialdocs.com/releases/release201304041200022/TREX-02562.pdf [Accessed 
30/05/2014] 
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Source: MDL 2179 Trial Docs, [Online] Available:   
http://www.mdl2179trialdocs.com/releases/release201304041200022/TREX-02562.pdf [Accessed 
30/05/2014] 
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Source: MDL 2179 Trial Docs, [Online] Available:   
http://www.mdl2179trialdocs.com/releases/release201304041200022/TREX-02562.pdf [Accessed 
30/05/2014] 
87 
 
 
Source: MDL 2179 Trial Docs, [Online] Available:   
http://www.mdl2179trialdocs.com/releases/release201304041200022/TREX-02562.pdf [Accessed 
30/05/2014] 
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Source: MDL 2179 Trial Docs, [Online] Available:  
http://www.mdl2179trialdocs.com/releases/release201304041200022/TREX-02562.pdf [Accessed 
30/05/2014] 
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Source: MDL 2179 Trial Docs, [Online] Available:  
http://www.mdl2179trialdocs.com/releases/release201304041200022/TREX-02562.pdf [Accessed 
30/05/2014] 
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Source: [Online] Available:  http://www.mdl2179trialdocs.com/releases/release201304041200022/TREX-
02562.pdf [Accessed 30/05/2014] 
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Appendices E 
Macondo Blowout Main technical causes 
 
(OLF, NOFO and NORWEGIAN SHIPOWNERS’ ASSOCIATION, Summary Report, Deepwater Horizon, Lessons 
learned and follow-up, 2012, Pg.6 [Online] Avaliable: 
http://www.norskoljeoggass.no/Global/Publikasjoner/_H%C3%A5ndb%C3%B8ker%20og%20Rapporter/DWH%
20rapporter/OLFs%20DWH%20rapport%20%202012.pdf Accessed: 16/04/2014) 
